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PREVIEW—Atlantic Richfield Company v. Christian: The
Intersection of Superfund and State-Law Restoration Claims
Emily McCulloch*
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral arguments
in this matter on Tuesday, December 3, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. in the Supreme
Court Building in Washington, D.C. Lisa S. Blatt will likely appear for the
Petitioner. Joseph R. Palmore will likely appear for the Respondents.
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco will likely argue for the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) began cleanup efforts
at the Anaconda Superfund Site in 1983—stemming from the 1980
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act’s (“CERCLA”)1 enactment—to address arsenic and lead
contamination from over a century of copper mining and refining around
Butte, Montana.2 ARCO argues that the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) remediation plan for the site is the sole remedy under
CERCLA and therefore bars state-law claims.3 The respondents, seventyseven area landowners (“Landowners”), contend they have a right to bring
common-law claims requiring ARCO to further remediate their land,
which the Anaconda Smelter polluted for over a century.4
The Supreme Court of the United States must review: (1) whether
a state-law claim for additional clean-up “challenges” the EPA’s sole
restoration remedy; (2) whether a landowner, who has never been ordered
to remediate their land, is considered a potentially responsible party
(“PRP”) in the EPA’s action plan; and (3) whether CERCLA preempts
conflicting state-law claims that require additional restoration.5 The
Court’s decision will impact future CERCLA claims because it could
allow state-law claims in addition to EPA-ordered remediation plans for
Superfund sites.



Emily McCulloch, J.D. & M.P.A Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III
School of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

42 U.S.C §§ 9601–9628 (2018).
Resp’ts’ Br. at 7–10, Oct. 15, 2019, No. 17-1498.
Pet’r’s Br. at 9, Aug. 21, 2019, No. 17-1498.
Resp’ts’Br. at 7–10.
Pet’r’s Br. at i.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1977, ARCO acquired the Anaconda Company in what some
described as “one of the decade’s worst mergers.”6 Three years later, the
company’s smelter in Anaconda, Montana, closed; ARCO became
responsible for remediation pursuant to CERCLA’s standards.7 Over the
next thirty-six years, ARCO spent around $450 million in CERCLAmandated cleanup.8
Local residents have asserted that the remediation efforts are
insufficient9 and that the area surrounding the smelter’s smokestack is
uninhabitable due to lead and arsenic contamination.10 ARCO, however,
says it has followed all CERCLA requirements despite the “Herculean
challenge[s]” posed by the “New York City-sized” site.11 ARCO
maintains that it has succeeded with remediation efforts and restored
wetlands and lush vegetation.12
In 2008, Landowners sued ARCO in Montana district court for
negligence, nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and constructive fraud,
seeking restoration damages.13 In December 2013, the district court
granted summary judgment for ARCO, holding that Montana’s statute of
limitations barred Landowners from recovery.14
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
the unjust enrichment and constructive fraud claims but reversed and
remanded the remaining claims, concluding the district court improperly
applied the statute of limitations.15
On remand, the district court awarded Landowners a restoration
remedy, which entitled Landowners to seek the measure of damages they
would be entitled to if ARCO trespassed and created a nuisance on
Landowners’ property.16
ARCO then requested a writ of supervisory control.17 The
Montana Supreme Court agreed with Landowners, however, stating that
their claim was not a “challenge” to the EPA, they were not PRPs, and
CERCLA did not preempt those claims.18

6.
Pet’r’s Br. at 9.
7.
Id.
8.
Id. at 11.
9.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 7–8.
10.
Id. at 9.
11.
Pet’r’s Br. at 11.
12.
Id. at 15.
13.
Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 358 P.3d 131, 139 (Mont. 2015).
14.
Id. at 139.
15.
Id.
16.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 51 (referencing Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v.
Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1087 (Mont. 2007).
17.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 408 P.3d
515 (Mont. 2017); see also Pet’r’s Br. at 19.
18.
Atl. Richfield Co., 408 P.3d at 522–23; see also Pet’r’s Br. at 20.
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On April 27, 2018, ARCO petitioned for certiorari, which the
Supreme Court granted on June 10, 2019.19 Of the original five claims, the
sole issue before the Court is the restoration damages claim.20
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
1. Jurisdiction
ARCO argues that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction because a
judgment that terminates original proceedings when the issue concerns
state court jurisdiction is reviewable, even if other issues remain pending
in lower courts.21 Additionally, ARCO notes the Court has jurisdiction
because, as an exception to the finality rule, restoration damages are a
distinct claim, and reversal “would dispose of the judgment before.”22
2. State-Law Claims & CERCLA
ARCO asserts that Montana courts lacked jurisdiction over
Landowners’ restoration claim because the term “federal” in the statute
bars state-law claims.23 ARCO claims Congress intended for federal
jurisdiction to cover all CERCLA claims because the statute’s expansive
language includes “all controversies” that are a “challenge” to CERCLA.24
Because Landowners “challenge” CERCLA through their own proposed
soil action and water contamination plans, “only federal courts . . . have
jurisdiction” to adjudicate the “challenge.”25 ARCO emphasizes that
CERCLA’s purpose is to allow challenges in very limited circumstances
in federal courts, and changing this interpretation would “blow a Montanasized hole in the statutory scheme.”26

19.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 139 S. Ct. 2690 (2019); see also
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, SCOTUSBLOG (last visited Nov. 11, 2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/atlantic-richfield-co-v-christian/.
20.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 10.
21.
Pet’r’s Rep. Br. at 2, Nov. 14, 2019, No. 17-1498 (citing Fisher v.
Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist., 424 U.S. 382, 385 (1976)).
22.
Id. at 3 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 482–83
(1975)).
23.
Pet’r’s Br. at 30 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b), which states that
matters apart from those addressed in subsection (a) and (h) are under the exclusive
jurisdiction of United States District Courts and states Section (h) is irrelevant because
the narrow exceptions listed do not apply).
24.
Id. at 27 (quoting Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. EPA, 189
F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999)).
25.
Id. (quoting Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. California EPA, 189
F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999)).
26.
Id. at 31.
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3. Potentially Responsible Parties
ARCO maintains that Landowners are PRPs, and, accordingly,
CERCLA bars their claims because ‘“no potentially responsible party may
undertake any remedial action at the facility’ without the EPA’s
authorization.”27 A PRP can be any “owner and operator of a vessel or a
facility,” and therefore, as ARCO argues, Landowners are subject to the
EPA’s remediation plan.28 ARCO asserts that allowing Landowners to fall
outside the scope of PRPs would greatly undermine the CERCLA’s
purpose because “landowners are the PRPs most likely to go off and
pursue their own visions of remediation.”29 Also, ARCO notes that “for
nearly 30 years, the EPA [in its own memorandum] has interpreted the
term ‘potentially responsible parties’ to encompass residential
landowners.”30
Additionally, ARCO challenges the Montana Supreme Court’s
holding that a PRP designation can only occur through a voluntary
settlement with the EPA, a judicial designation, or defendant status in a
CERCLA lawsuit.31 ARCO argues that parties are PRPs before any
litigation begins.32 ARCO states the critical statutory word in PRP is
“potential” because a party has the potential of being a PRP even if they
are factually non-liable.33 Finally, ARCO points out the EPA’s
remediation plan benefits all parties because it takes into account all PRPs,
including Landowners.34
ARCO also questions the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling that
CERCLA limits PRP designation to six years.35 ARCO maintains that
because Landowners did not fall within the three designations, the statute
of limitations prevents their designation as PRPs.36 ARCO argues the
intent behind designating PRPs was to avoid “reach[ing] the six-year mark
without facing a qualifying suit or settlement and launch[ing] their own

27.
Id. at 32 (referencing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009) (holding that landowners were PRPs because they owned
and used the contaminated land)).
28.
Id. at 33.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 35 (referencing Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Assistant
Adm’r, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response & Raymond B.
Ludwiszewski, Acting Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement, to EPA Reg’l
Adm’rs, Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites, 1, 3–4
(July 3, 1991) (available at https://bit.ly/2TEmQ1E).
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 36.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 37.
35.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 408 P.3d
515, 522 (Mont. 2017).
36.
Pet’r’s Br. at 38 (rejecting the court’s reasoning, which was based
on 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B), stating the party must commence the initial recovery
action for remedial costs within 6 years.)
37.
Id.
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personal cleanup plan.”37 ARCO emphasizes the purpose of CERCLA is
to allow the EPA to remediate a situation as soon as possible without
interference from proposed limitations.38 Moreover, ARCO notes
Landowners have no exemptions from designation, and if the Court found
an exemption, it would permit “anyone who could invoke these defenses
to do whatever they want with Superfund sites.”39 If Landowners did have
a defense, ARCO contends they are only covered if they abide by the
EPA’s plan.40 Finally, ARCO denies Landowners’ contention that they are
a “contiguous party” because no court has granted them such status.41
4. Preemption
ARCO argues state and federal law conflict, and thus it cannot
comply with both the EPA plan and Landowners’ claims.42 Additionally,
ARCO maintains that once the EPA performed a remedial investigation,
ARCO then lacked the authority to move ahead with any other remedial
plans without the EPA’s permission.43 Because the EPA’s regulations set
both a ceiling and a floor, ARCO argues that states cannot require more
remediation.44
Moreover, ARCO asserts that a restoration remedy conflicts with
CERCLA’s objectives.45 If state law conflicts with a federal law’s
objectives, then it is considered an “obstacle to Congress.”46 ARCO argues
the “obstacle” here is Montana’s law which does not allow CERCLA “to
choose and implement the most effective means of cleaning up hazardous
waste sites.”47 Additionally, ARCO states that if Landowners succeed with
their remediation claim, it would dissuade voluntary cooperation from
PRPs because of additional litigation threats.48
Finally, ARCO declares that CERCLA’s savings clauses do not
apply to Landowners’ remediation claims.49 Although CERCLA does not
preempt all state environmental claims, ARCO nevertheless argues that it
does not encompass state laws that “seek to dictate substantive clean-up”
steps.50 In short, CERCLA’s savings clauses only allow for common-law

38.
Id. at 40.
39.
Id.
40
Pet’r’s Rep. Br. at 10.
41.
Id. at 15.
42.
Pet’r’s Br. at 40.
43.
Id. at 44.
44.
Id. at 50.
45.
Id. at 47.
46.
Id. (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
47.
Id. at 48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)–(d)).
48.
Id. at 50.
49.
Id. at 52.
50.
Id. at 54.
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claims and do not permit “challenges” brought against ARCO’s cleanup
obligations.51
B. Respondents’ Arguments
1. Jurisdiction
Landowners assert the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction52 because
the lower courts have not issued a final holding on the remediation
damages claim, and thus it is not “an effective determination of the
litigation . . . [but rather is] merely interlocutory or intermediate . . . .”53
2. State-Law Claims & CERCLA
Landowners assert ARCO failed to take into account the second
provision under the “express terms” of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), which only
applies to claims brought under federal jurisdiction, not state-law
jurisdiction.54 Landowners argue Congress intended to use precise
language by creating the exceptions under Section (a) and Section (h).55
Additionally, Congress intended to limit Section (b) by using “arising
under[,]” so Landowners argue ARCO misinterpreted Congress’s intent.56
Ultimately, Landowners argue that Section (b) does not apply because
CERCLA does not apply.57
Landowners also note the legislative history “confirms what the
statutory text dictates: Section 113 does not bar state-law actions in state
court.”58 The original Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act59
(“SARA”) included a similar section to CERCLA’s Section (h) but left out
“federal” and merely stated “No court shall have jurisdiction . . . .”60 Then
Congress revised the SARA to include “federal[,]” which Landowners
argue shows Congress did not intend for CERCLA to preempt all statelaw claims.61
Further, Landowners argue even if Section (h) applied to state-law
claims, ARCO’s argument still fails because Landowners are not
51.
Id. at 55.
52.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 18.
53.
Id. (quoting Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81 (1997)).
54.
Id. at 22.
55.
Id. at 23–24.
56.
Id. at 24–25.
57.
Id. at 21–23.
58.
Id. at 29.
59.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1650.
60.
Id.; Resp’ts’ Br. (citing H.R. Res. 2005, 99th Cong. § 113(h)
(1985)).
61.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 30–31 (citing 132 Cong. Rec. 33,554-55 (Oct. 17,
1986 (stating that the provision was revised to preserve actions “based on State
nuisance law, or actions to abate the hazardous substance release itself, independent
of Federal response action”).
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challenging the EPA’s remedial orders.62 To qualify as a challenge,
Landowners contend a plaintiff must contest the “legality of an EPA
ordered remedy” leading to judicial review.63 Based upon the Section (h)’s
five timing exceptions, Landowners argue Congress was specifically
concerned with timing of review based on their “selective remedy for a
qualified time.”64 Therefore, given the timing of the suit, Landowners
maintain this is not a challenge with respect to an EPA remedial order.65
Finally, Landowners dispute ARCO’s argument that CERCLA
governs any legal claim that involves a cleanup outside EPA’s remedy.66
Landowners note that “had Congress intended Section 113(h) to preclude
any additional, non-CERCLA remediation, it would have said so expressly
. . . .”67
3. Potentially Responsible Parties
Landowners agree a PRP is a “party who faces some possibility
of CERCLA liability” but argue there is no such possibility here because
Landowners did not contaminate their property.68 Landowners argue an
owner is defined as a “covered person[,]” not a PRP as ARCO insists.69
According to the Landowners, the Supreme Court has held that PRPs are
covered persons under CERCLA, but it has never considered whether all
covered persons are PRPs.70 Because the Court has never specifically
decided this issue, Landowners argue they are not automatically PRPs.71
Further, as Landowners assert, if property owners are PRPs, then the EPA
would possess absolute authority to control any remedial action, thus
constituting a taking under the Fifth Amendment.72 Landowners state that
forcing innocent parties to “forever house pollutants” on their land
amounts to a ‘“current physical occupation of land”’ and therefore a
taking.73 Additionally, Landowners explain that legislative history shows
Congress did not intend for a PRP to include any party other than those
who could be liable.74 Moreover, statutes of limitations do apply here to
62.
Id. at 31.
63.
Id. at 32 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 9604).
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 34.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 36.
69.
Id. at 38.
70.
Id. at 38–39.
71.
Id. at 39.
72.
Id. at 42.
73.
Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 421 (1982)).
74.
Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (explaining that usage was reflected in
the version of SARA that passed the House, which expressly defined “potentially
responsible party” to mean “a person against whom an action could be brought under
section 106 with respect to [a] release or a person who would be liable under section
107 if response costs were incurred.” H.R. Res. 2005, 99th Cong. § 122(k) (1985)).

8

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

encourage timely prosecution, which does not negate the EPA’s power to
prosecute PRPs as ARCO contends.75
Furthermore, Landowners—assuming arguendo that the statutory
language considers them PRPs—assert they are nonetheless considered an
exempt “contiguous party” under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q).76 Pursuant to that
section, real property owners who own land next to a hazardous site “shall
not be considered to be an owner or operator” of a “facility.”77 Landowners
note that even if they are PRPs, the Court will still have to remand in order
for the state court to determine how to proceed.78
4. Preemption
Landowners argue that because they are bringing state nuisance
and trespass claims, there is no conflict between federal and state law.79
Landowners state “no federal law required ARCO to deposit arsenic, lead,
and other toxic metals on Landowners’ yards or prohibits ARCO from
paying money to Landowners to use in cleaning their land.”80 Further,
Landowners note “unless EPA would never permit ARCO to further
remediate, it would not be impossible for ARCO to compl[y] with both
federal and state regulations.”81 Also, Landowners contend ARCO did not
make an effort to seek the EPA’s permission to remove any additional
contamination from the land.82 For example, ARCO argues the proposed
underground trenches for water contamination and additional soil removal
are inconsistent with the EPA’s remediation plan, precluding the
additional requirements.83 Landowners contend the additional remediation
does not conflict with EPA’s plan because there is no indication that the
EPA would not allow additional remedies.84
In response to ARCO’s concern that a state-law suit will interfere
with CERCLA’s goals, Landowners contend that Congress would have
specifically laid that out as its intent in creating CERCLA, arguing that
75.
Id. at 46–47.
76.
Id. at 47.
77.
Id. at 48 (explaining that under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(i)–(vii),
Landowners did not “cause, contribute, or consent to the release” of that substance;
they are not potentially liable through any relationship with the entity that did pollute
their land, i.e., ARCO; they have not allowed any further releases from their property;
and they have complied with any land-use and notice obligations that might be
imposed).
78.
Id. at 49–50.
79.
Id. at 50.
80.
Id. at 53–54.
81.
Id. at 55 (quoting Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139
S. Ct. 1668, 1675 (2019)).
82.
Id. at 56.
83.
Id. at 58.
84.
Id. at 59.
85.
Id. at 59–60 (referencing Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122,
126 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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Congress intended CERCLA to set a floor—not a ceiling—relating to
hazardous wastes, so states can enact supplemental laws.85 Landowners
point to language in 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) that reduces the amount a person
can recover under state law for removal costs, which indicates there is
recourse on a state level.86 Landowners cite to Justice Alito’s opinion
which stated, “if CERCLA’s remedies preempted state remedies for
recovering costs of hazardous waste cleanups, § 114(b) would make no
sense at all . . . .”87 Additionally, a state law claim for remedial efforts
provides only additional, not conflicting liability.88 Finally, in addressing
ARCO’s point that allowing state-law claims will negate negotiation
settlements and create environmental risks, Landowners again declare that
Congress neither intended state law claims to preclude settlements nor
intended to prohibit state law claims from requiring additional cleanup.89
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The Court will need to address Landowners’ argument that the
Court lacks jurisdiction over their state-law claim because the case has not
fully been decided. The Court has twice exercised jurisdiction over
Montana Supreme Court’s original petition decisions in Fisher v. District
Court and Kennerly v. District Court.90 The Court will likely look to Cox
Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn to determine if one of the following
exceptions—specifically the fourth exception—to the finality rule may
apply: (1) when a federal issue is conclusive or there is a likely outcome
of the proceedings; (2) when a federal issue decided by a state supreme
court may “survive” regardless of future proceedings; (3) when a federal
claim has been decided but there are other issues on the merits still being
tried in state courts; or (4) when a federal issue is final but the party
seeking review may prevail on nonfederal grounds.91
Additionally, ARCO argues this matter may fall under a fifth
exception: original proceedings.92 The Court has stated “new situations
call for adaptation of judicial remedies.”93 The Court will likely consider

86.
Id. at 61.
87.
Id. at 62 (quoting Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 127
(3d Cir. 1991).
88.
Id. at 63.
89.
Id. at 65–66.
90.
United States Amicus Br. at 16, Aug. 28, 2019, No. 17-1498.
91.
420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975).
92.
Pet’r’s Br. at 19.
93.
Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 133 (1945)
(stating “[the Court] will give full play both to the powers that belong to the States
and to those that are entrusted to the Federal Communications Commission, where the
two are intertwined as they are here, to enforce the accommodation we have
formulated”).
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this an original proceeding and therefore consider the issue ripe.94
Although none of the current Justices presided over these past cases,
precedent indicates the Court likely will find it has jurisdiction.
B. Can Landowners Bring State-Law Claims Notwithstanding CERCLA?
The Court must address two issues under this claim: (1) if the
Montana Supreme Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim; and (2)
if Landowners’ claim “challenges” the EPA’s remedy under CERCLA.
ARCO cites Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA, in which the Court
held that 42 U.S.C § 9613(h)(4) “do[es] not permit district courts to
exercise jurisdiction over citizens suits challenging incomplete EPA
remedial actions even where impending irreparable harm is alleged.”95 In
essence, the Third Circuit states the pre-remediation review through public
comment serves as judicial review.96 There are narrow exceptions under
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) where review by federal courts is appropriate.97 For
example, the Ninth Circuit held in Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal.
EPA that only federal courts have jurisdiction over CERCLA claims. 98
Landowners do not disagree that federal courts have jurisdiction under
CERCLA, but they argue that their claim is one that arises under state
law.99 In Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., the Montana
Supreme Court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Cleanup and
Responsibility Act, a state environmental law like CERCLA, does not
preempt state-law claims.100 Additionally, if this were a state-law claim,
the complaint does not arise under federal law because ARCO’s issues are
based on defenses to CERCLA, which cannot invoke federal law under
the well-pleaded complaint rule.101
If the Court does, however, decide that this matter is under federal
jurisdiction or that state-law claims are precluded, the Court must decide
if this was a “challenge” to the EPA’s remediation plan. In order to address
whether state-law claims are considered a challenge and are therefore
barred through CERCLA, the Court will likely look at legislative intent.
In order to determine the scope of the statutory provision stating “all
controversies arising under this chapter,” the Court must decide whether
Congress intended to use “language more expansive than necessary” to
encompass all claims brought under CERCLA.102 In contrast, the Court

94.
See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 482 (1975).
95.
116 F.3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997).
96.
Id. at 1025.
97.
Pet’r’s. Br. at 26.
98.
189 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999).
99.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 27–28.
100.
165 P.3d 1079, 1091 (Mont. 2007).
101.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 24 (referencing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 63 (1987)).
102.
Pet’r’s Br. at 27 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b)).
103.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 34.
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may also consider Landowners’ contention that if Congress intended to
encompass all claims, it would have expressly said so in the statute.103
In weighing whether this is a state-law or federal claim, the Court
will likely address states’ rights in making their own legislation. While
many lower courts have barred state-law claims, the Court’s current
members appear friendly to state rights. Justice Alito, for example, has
previously stated in a case looking at preemption issues that: “[I]t is as if
federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were
armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending
proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to
imagine.”104 With this sentiment in mind, the Court may lean toward state
court jurisdiction.
3. Are Landowners Considered Potentially Responsible Parties?
Additionally, the Court will likely address whether Landowners
are PRPs within the statutory definition. Again, the Court’s answer will
likely hinge on its evaluation of Congressional intent. ARCO argues the
clear intent of CERCLA was to include landowners as PRPs to preempt
any restoration claims.105 Moreover, United States v. Best Foods held that
parties who are potentially responsible are liable under CERCLA.106
Landowners maintain, however, that the Court has never addressed
whether a party can be a PRP if they did not cause the contamination.107
The Court will likely resist ARCO’s argument that a PRP can be
an innocent landowner because “questions that merely lurk in the record”
require further analysis by the Court.108 Additionally, Landowners cite to
legislative history that may persuade this Court, such as the fact that the
original CERCLA language never included PRP.109 SARA added PRP to
“refer to the parties with which it negotiated and that would be responsible
for cleanup[.]”110 Given the legislative history, as well as the Court’s
concerns regarding ambiguity, the Court will not likely consider a nonpolluting land owner to automatically qualify as a PRP.
4. Does CERCLA Preempt a Restoration Remedy?
Finally, the Court will consider ARCO’s impossibility preemption
claim, as well as Landowners’ savings clause defense. With regard to the

104.

Murphy v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478

105.
106.
107.
108.

Pet’r’s Br. at 36.
524 U.S. 51 (1998).
Resp’ts’ Br. at 39.
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Availl Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170

109.
110.

Resp’ts’ Br. at 43.
Id.

(2018).

(2004).
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impossibility preemption claim, ARCO relies on the Court’s holding that
when federal law forbids an action—but state law requires it—then federal
law preempts the state law.111 In a series of decisions, the Court held that
certain state laws make it impossible for a party to also follow federal
law.112 The Court will likely need to analyze whether the state law claims
for remediation will interfere with the federal law to the extent that federal
law can preempt the state claim.113 Based on the holdings of three FDA
cases where the Court found impossibility preemption, it is likely
Landowners will lose on this issue. However, in Mutual Pharmaceutical
Company, Inc. v. Bartlett, Justices Breyer, Kagan, Ginsberg, and
Sotomayor all dissented, specifically noting “Congress' preservation of a
role for state law generally, and common-law remedies specifically,
reflects a realistic understanding of the limitations of ex ante federal
regulatory review . . . .”114 Considering these differing opinions, the
holding on impossibility preemption will likely depend on Justice
Kavanaugh’s stance.
Landowners also argue CERCLA’s savings clauses prevent
federal preemption.115 Section 9614(a) of CERCLA states, “Nothing in
this [Act] shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from
imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the
release of hazardous substances within such State.”116 In Williamson v.
Mazda Motor of American, Inc., Justice Thomas wrote in concurrence that
the plain text of a savings clause speaks for itself.117 Additionally, Justices
Roberts, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Alito all agreed that if there is express
preemption language, then the regulation does not preempt the state law.118
It remains uncertain, however, whether Court will agree with Landowners
that there is express language in CERCLA’s savings’ clauses. The Court
may, alternatively, agree with ARCO and the read savings clauses
narrowly in deciding the issue.119
V. CONCLUSION
Landowners’ ability to bring a state-law claim, in addition to the
EPA’s prescribed remedy, will likely come down to a states’ rights battle.
111.
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 486 (2013).
112.
Pet’r’s Br. at 41–42 (citing Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S.
472 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009)).
113.
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963).
114.
570 U.S. 472, 520 (2013).
115.
Resp’ts’ Br. at 62.
116.
Id.
117.
562 U.S. 323, 339 (2011).
118.
Id. at 336.
119.
ARCO maintains that the savings clauses only apply to state
liability laws governing “compensation for injury to persons of property, but not state
laws that purport to require cleanups that differ from CERCLA’s.” Pet’r’s Br. at 25.
51–56.
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Ultimately, this Court’s precedent shows its deference to states’ rights
arguments. However, ARCO’s position that allowing state-law claims
will open the flood gates and become highly burdensome on companies
may persuade this Court. If the Court decides that CERCLA bars
Landowners’ claim, the Court’s holding will nonetheless provide guidance
as to what constitutes a challenge to CERCLA and whether non-polluting
landowners are PRPs.

